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Abstract
Software development organizations, both commercial and governmental, are
undergoing rapid change spurred by developments in the computing industry. To
stay competitive, these organizations must adopt new technologies, slalls, and prac-
tices quickly. Yet even for an organization with a well-developed set of software
engineering models and processes, transitioning to a new technology can be
expensive and risky. Current industry trends are leading away from traditional
mainframe environments and toward the workstation-based, open systems world.
This paper presents the experiences of software engineers on three recent projects
that pioneered open systems development for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA 's) Flight Dynamics Division of the Goddard Space Flight
Center (GSFC).
Introduction
How can an organization effectively accomplish
technology transition? Introducing a new tech-
nolog3: into an organization requires an invest-
ment. But what is the nature and size of that
investment, and how long will it be before bene-
fits are realized? How can one quantitatively
define these benefits and measure the results?
Whatever the ultimate reward of the technology,
transition is a step into uncharted waters. Tech-
nolog?' infusion requires managers to rethink the
way they approach the ordinary, project man-
agement challenges of developing effort esti-
mates, achieving planned productivity, and
dealing with evolving requirements.
The authors of this paper develop soft_are sys-
tems under contract to the NASA/GSFC Flight
Dynamics Division (FDD). For more than two
decades, the FDD has successfully fielded soft-
ware systems to support NASA spacecraft
missions in a relatively stable mainframe/-
minicomputer environment. This stability has
allowed the FDD to optimize its software
development process. During the first half of the
1990s, the authors worked on three projects in
the forefront of the FDD's transition from its
legacy environment to a workstation-based open
systems environment. We discovered that our
established development process had to transition
as well, in unanticipated ways. Our experiences
in this transition and our lessons learned are
recorded here with some recommendations for
managing technology transitions.
A model commonly used for technology transfer
conceives of technology as moving from a pro-
ducer to a consumer organization. The transition
moves through the phases of early experimenta-
tion and exploration to technical maturity. The
projects discussed in this paper fall primarily
within the exploratoo" phase, where work has
progressed from initial experiments to full-scale
development, but the technology is still used by a
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minority of the organization's staff. Marvin
Zelkowitz defined these phases in a paper pre-
sented at the 18th Annual Software Engineering
Workshop, 'Software Engineering Technology
Transfer: Understanding the Process."
This paper provides information on the software
development organization, then summarizes our
observations on each of the case study projects.
We then organize the lessons learned and rec-
ommend elements of a technology transition plan
and ways in which new technology projects
might be better managed.
The FDD Software
Development Organization
The FDD entered the transition with a mature
sofbvaxe development organization that included
the Software Engineering Laboratory (SEL), a
research and process improvement group whose
mature measurement program, cost and schedule
estimation models, and management guidelines
support software development and technology
transfer in this environment.
The FDD had patterned its success on a basic
scientific method of gradual, continuous improve-
ment in software engineering technology in a
stable computing environment. Controlled inno-
vations were introduced to test new techniques
and tools. Studies usually were conducted
through pilot projects that applied the new tech-
nology under strict controls, with the results
evaluated against the organization's norms. The
FDD would then incorporate proven beneficial
technologies into the standard technology suite.
The FDD had made little investment in explor-
ing open systems technologies. The FDD's few
projects outside the mainframe environment were
considered out of the organization's mainstream.
Developers collected few statistics, and few
software engineering experiments were con-
ducted on these projects. When the computing
industry began to shit_ toward workstations, the
C language, and open systems concepts, the
FDD had little background in these technologies.
Since 1990, the FDD has been moving toward
workstation computing platforms and open sys-
tems technology, driven primarily by factors
external to the development orgamzation. They
have done so without the benefit or lead of SEL
experiments. Figure 1 illustrates the FDD's
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Figure 1. FDD Transition to Open Systems
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investment in new technology exploration and the
quickening pace of the transition. The case
studies discussed in this report are shown at the
bottom of the figure in their chronological
context.
The Case Study Projects
Table 1 provides an overview of the three case
study projects, listing the size and language,
operational computing environments, and devel-
opment tools. The projects were planned by
tailoring the domain-specific FDD cost and
schedule models. The tailoring allowed for some
training on specific new technologies. As work
progressed, plans were revised to reflect the
technology issues. Figure 2 summarizes the
development results compared to the plan.
Case Study 1 : User Interface
Executive (UIX)
The FDD saw a need for a common framework
in the new environment. The FDD planned the
UIX as a common user interface and executive
framework for distributed mission support sys-
tems. The decision to base the user interface on
X/Motif was primarily driven by industry trends.
The aim was to create a configurable system to
be used by developers working in Ada, C, or
FORTRAN to build application programs that
shared a common set of interactive tools. The
application developers would not be required to
code in X/Motif or to use a GUI builder. The
UIX would allow application users to control
multiple, distributed processes in a platform-
transparent manner. Finally, the FDD required
that the UIX support existing hardware
Table 1. Case Study Project Characteristics
Project
Descriptors
Size in KSLOCs
and Language
Platform and
Infrastructure
Software
Development
Tools
Case Study 1: UIX
65,000 C
* 386 and 486 PCs
• Santa Cruz Operation (SCO)
UNIX
• HP 9000/7xx series
workstations
• I-[P/UX
• External Data Representation
(XDR)
• X/Motif(X11R4, later R5)
• Intersolv PVCS version
control
• SCO Open Desk'top toolset
Case Study 2: GSS
212,000 Ada
• Digital Equipment Corp.
(DEC) VAX 8820 (later Alpha
AXP/4000), open VMS
• 486 PCs
• SCO UNIX
• kip 9000/7xx series
workstations
• HP/UX 9.0.3 or higher
* DEC Configuration Manage-
ment System (CMS)
• DEC VAXSet Development
Toolset
* DEC Ada Compiler Version
2.2
• Rational Software Corp.
VADSelfAda for 486 SCO,
HPRJX
Case Study 3: XTE AGSS
66,000 C
58,000 FORTRAN
9,000 User Interface Language
(UIL)
• Hewlett-Packard (liP) 7xx
workstations
• HP/UX
• X-terminal and V'I2000
emulation
• X/Motif(X11R5)
• Builder Xcessory (X Window
GUI builder)
• HP full-screen editor
• HP desktop environment
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(the IBM mainframes and Intel-386 PCs) to the
ma,ximum extent possible.
Prototyping played a critical role. The ambi-
tious goals of the UIX project were all the more
challenging because it was the first to use open
systems technology within the FDD. To learn
the technology and refine the requirements, the
development team built a prototype that covered
all major facets of the proposed UIX. Develop-
ment and evaluation of the prototype ultimately
spanned a year and a half. In parallel with the
prototype evaluation, the team began specifying
the content of the actual UIX. The prototyping
experience led to architectural and conceptual
changes in the specified product, including aban-
doning the goal of supporting the IBM main-
frame as an application host and deferring
implementation of distributed process control
until indust_' capabilities had further evolved.
Lack of a technical infrastructure and an
organizational transition plan caused difficul-
tTes. Without a preestablished infrastructure
('h]iddleware" such as a network file server), the
traditional separation of concerns between the
systems support and software development
organizations was blurred. It was sometimes
unclear whether responsibility for selecting an
infrastructure product lay with the project that
first needed the capabilit 3' (in this case, the UIX)
or with the support organization that maintained
the FDD's institutional hardware resources.
Although cross-organizational groups addressed
these issues, the lack of an overall transition plan
led to misunderstandings and organizational
friction.
The FDD's traditional functional requirements
and specifications methodology was not
sufficient for establishing the infrastructure.
Software developers, especially those fi-om
mainframe backgrounds, tend to take the exis-
tence of a computing system architecture for
granted, but this was not the case with the UIX.
The developers attempted to define the required
software infrastructure using data flow diagrams
and functional specifications, the method with
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which they were familiar. Unfortunately, their
limited knowledge of the technologies involved
and the immaturity, of available products mud-
died the development effort. One round of proto-
typing followed by one round of specification
development was not sufficient, nor was the
specification formalism conducive to iterative
refinement.
Prototyping experience led to technical learning
but not better planning. Although the proto_p-
ing experience clarified technical issues, it taught
the developers little about planning the develop-
ment project. The3' believed that the effort saved
by rapid protot3.ping would offset the additional
effort needed to come up the learning cur_,e on
the new technologies. In the actual project
experience, there was still a substantial learning
curve in spite of an overlap of development team
members _dth the prototypmg team. (For
example, the comple.'d_' of X/Motif coding was
underestimated.) The prototyping team achieved
the organization's average productivi_' based on
historical data. However, productivi_, on the
actual UIX development was initially only half
that of the proto_l_e project, as the team faced
continued technical learning as well as the
documentation and inspection demands of a dis-
ciplined development methodolog3'. Further-
more, the final system was larger (by a factor of
about two) and more complex than indicated by
the prototyping
Case Study 2: Generalized
Support Software (GSS)
The GSS project transinoned the post-
integration development phase only. The GSS
is a multiapplication flight dynamics support
class libra,, designed to interface with the UIX.
The GSS project was the FDD's first Ada lan-
guage soft_'are development project to make the
transition to the open systems workstation envi-
ronment. Unlike the other two case studies pre-
sented in this paper, the GSS was not developed
in an open systems environment. The GSS was
designed, coded, and integrated in the standard
development environment for Ada-based
software projects in the FDD, which was a DEC
VAX system (later, a DEC Alpha system). The
code was then ported to the SCO UNIX envi-
ronment on PCs for integration with the UIX to
create the operational system (an attitude
telemetry, simulator), with the UIX providing the
user interface services. Thus, the technological
"leap" taken by GSS was considerably smaller.
The infrastructure needed for a workstation-
based development was underestimated. When
the GSS project started production in January
1993, the FDD did not have sufficient worksta-
tions and associated Ada development tools to
support a development the size of the GSS on
workstations. The GSS project was not budg-
eted to procure the workstations and tools needed
to develop the system totally in a workstation
environment. FDD management decided that the
most cost-effective approach would be to
develop the GSS software on the institutional
Ada development platform, a VAX 8820 mini-
computer, until the build integration test phase.
At that time, the sottware for the build would be
ported to the workstation environment.
A familiar development environment helped
control system growth. The growth in size of
the GSS is fairly consistent with FDD projects
over the past 5 years. The reasons for the rela-
tively limited gro_ compared to the other case
studies are
* GSS is developed in Ada, a language FDD
software developers have been using for
almost a decade.
* The developers were familiar with the GSS
development environment and toolset, and
only the latter phases of the life cycle (build
integration through independent test) were
performed on the workstation platforms.
The GSS project comprised pure computational
applications software, not interactive software.
The GSS project did not have to deal with user-
system interface issues in the new open systems
environment. Because the UIX system provides
the GUI for GSS-based flight dynamics
applications, the GSS project was "shielded"
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from many of the technological hurdles and
learning curve relating to building GUIs on
workstation platforms. This experience suggests
that scientific application development is less
affected when moving to open systems platforms
than is user interface software development.
Case Study 3: X-Ray Timing
Explorer Attitude Ground Support
System (XTE AGSS)
The FDD faced a new requirement to deliver
software on workstations. On this project the
FDD developed mission attitude ground support
applications in an open systems workstation
environment. The FDD had developed these
types of applications before but only in an IBM
mainframe environment. The FDD was required
to deliver the applications to a separate GSFC
organization, the Mission Operations Division
(MOD), for integration into their operational
system. Such applications had previously been
installed and operated only within the FDD envi-
ronment. The MOD systems use a locally devel-
oped package called Transportable Payload
Operations Control Center (TPOCC) to provide
the client-server framework.
Project planning was largely based on experi-
ence in the legacy environment. The project
planners estimated size (in lines of code) of the
applications based on previous FDD systems.
The planners determined they could reuse a large
amount of FORTRAN computational code being
developed concurrently on the mainframe. Since
XTE AGSS was a first-of-a-kind project, the
planners lacked good comparisons to help esti-
mate how the use of TPOCC and X/Motif
graphics would affect the size. A productivity
rate 20 percent lower than the FDD norm was
used to account for the new technology learning
CHIVe.
The XTE development effort was stgnificantly
underestimated. As it turned out, the size of the
applications was underestimated by a factor of
three, primarily because
• Planners underestimated the size of the
TPOCC and graphics-related code.
• Reused code was larger than expected.
• Requirement changes added major new
functionality.
Productivity on the initial builds was considera-
bly lower than expected. The main causes of the
lowered productivity were underestimation of the
complexity of the new technology, the lack of
X/Motif expertise on the team, and skill mix
problems. Productivity increased in the later
builds as the team became more experienced
vdth the technology and as the skill mix
improved; some builds met or exceeded the FDD
norm.
The traditional methodology had to change to
incorporate iteratTon. Only about half the unit
designs had been completed by the time of criti-
cal design review. (FDD methodology called for
all unit designs to be complete at that point.)
This indicated trouble, but the developers and
their management did not realize the full extent
of the effort underestimation until the coding
phase. Then it became clear that they could not
complete the project according to the original
plans, and they had to renegotiate the delivery,
schedule and add staff. The new schedule was
still highly compressed because of XTE mission
deadlines, forcing the developers into an iterative
approach of designing and coding build by
build. For the most part the iterative approach
worked well, though it made assessing progress
difficult.
Requirements instability exacerbated problems.
It is common in FDD development projects that
sot_vare requirements evolve during the course
of development. The XTE project encountered
challenging, though not unprecedented, require-
ments instability, partly because the FDD ana-
lysts thought of ways to make the software more
generic well a__er design and implementation
were underway. System specifications were
changed on several occasions to serve the best
long-term interests of the FDD. The resulting
perturbations were far more severe than they
normally would have been because the project
was in technology transition.
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The development team needed immersion in the
technology to come up to speed. One of the
major challenges of the project was learning the
TPOCC system. This amounted to technology
transfer from the MOD to the FDD. The
TPOCC system is large and complicated, and the
XTE development team could find no single per-
son who was expert m all aspects of the system.
Early m the implementation phase, part of the
development team relocated to the MOD devel-
opment facility for 2 months. The relocation
was very useful for promoting communications,
though interaction was limited because the MOD
developers were busy with their own projects.
The early builds implemented the TPOCC inter-
faces and were kept relatively small to allow
quick feedback. To get a testable framework m
place, the team split the first build m two when it
turned out to be far larger than planned.
Unrecognized technological assumptions created
transition problems. The biggest problem
encountered with TPOCC was not m implement-
ing the application interfaces, but m installing
TPOCC m the FDD. Differences between the
MOD and the FDD computer environments and
system administration approaches became evi-
dent. For instance, the FDD used network user
accounts, with which TPOCC was not compati-
ble. Other problems developed when the MOD
moved to new releases of the HP operating sys-
tem and Motif before these versions were avail-
able to the FDD. In retrospect, the memoranda
of understanding between the FDD and the
MOD, which only addressed XTE AGSS release
dates, should have also specified TPOCC ver-
sion delivery dates, versions of system and sup-
port software to be used, and all applicable
standards.
Increasing personal interaction and emphasiz-
ing slall mix helped allewate problems. After
the FDD tested the releases m-house, the plan
called for delivering them to the MOD for inte-
gration into the operational environment.
Because of all the unexpected problems
encountered thus far m the project, the FDD
development team decided to work with the
MOD developers informally to integrate the
system before formal delivery. The main prob-
lems found during informal integration and test-
ing were with installation instructions, not with
the software itself.
A final factor very important to the success of
the XTE AGSS was stat_g. Once the true
magnitude of the development effort was under-
stood, project management committed highly
experienced and motivated individuals to the
team. They provided a good skill mix that
included both software development and appli-
cation domain knowledge and C and FORTRAN
experience. In spite of the pressures, this
commitment led to a very good team spirit and a
successful product.
Lessons Learned
The complexity of open systems was much
deeper than anticipated in all three case study
projects. The developers learned that '_ndustry
standards" are often evolving or competing con-
ventions, that COTS products are marketed
before they are mature, and that mteroperability
does not always live up to advertised expecta-
tions. They discovered how much middleware it
really takes to make a distributed system work.
The organization realized how significant the
choice of hardware is to the viability of the final
system, how much hardware is needed to fully
support a distributed development effort, and
that the costs for support software and develop-
ment environments can rival or exceed the cost
of the hardware. They also had to find ways to
overcome compartmentalization of open systems
knowledge in their own and in interfacing organ-
izations. We have grouped these lessons around
organizational, technological, and managerial
themes.
Organizational Lessons
Organizatmnal transition plan. A planned
transition for the entire organization, backed by
management commilment, is needed. The case
studies indicate that the FDD approached the
transition on a project-by-project basis, not only
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reducing coordination but also slowing the dis-
persion of knowledge. Management did attempt
to coordinate activities at the top levels of the
organization, but the staff on the individual proj-
ects received little information as to how their
project fit into the plan. As a consequence,
people focused almost exclusively on the chal-
lenges of using the new technology on their own
projects, with little incentive to share their expe-
riences with others in the organization.
Changing organizatTonal roles. Changing tech-
nology can blur traditional roles, garble com-
munications, and cause friction. No doubt this is
part of what makes transition plans hard to cre-
ate in the first place. Effects of technology
change can ripple across organizations in ways
they cannot readily accommodate. The leaders
of the organization must define and communicate
a vision for doing business using the new tech-
nology and help the staff make organizational
changes stemming from it. Changing technology
does not necessarily mean business reengineer-
ing, but if the organization is making a major
technology change it should carefully evaluate
the tmpact on its business model as well.
Outreach across organizatTonal boundaries.
Sharing experiences across project and depart-
ment boundaries is critical during technolog).,
transition. "Department" here means an), por-
tion of the organization that traditionally prac-
tices "information hiding" from other portions.
The case studies shiny that information barriers
can exist even at the lowest levels. Groups of 5
or 10 people do_aa the hall from each other may
not share information even though they are
engaged in parallel transitions. This may seem
counterintuitive to anyone who has experienced
the "office grapevine." but people do not grasp
organizational plans through the grapevine. Per-
sonal contact works well for transferring detailed
knaowledge when people have a focus and goals,
but it takes a special effort to find that focus.
Management must provide forums, whether
formal or informal, for sharing new technolog3"
experiences in real time without 'turf" issues
interfering.
Disseminating lessons learned. The FDD has a
tradition of writing good history documents after
each project to capture lessons leamed, but often
they come out too late to help the project plan-
ners who really need them. Also, if a procedure
for using them is not integral to the development
methodology, the lessons may sit on the shelf
unheeded. An organization should document
lessons learned at points in the development
process well before the project's end and should
make producing and using them part of the
development procedure. The lessons should be
disseminated in a way that will make them easy
to access (for example, in a cross-indexed on-line
libra,'). The goal should be to coalesce the les-
sons into an institutional knowledge base.
Technological Lessons
CultTvatTng market awareness. The competitive
marketplace drives the evolution of open tech-
nologies, so using them effectively requires culti-
vating and maintaining market awareness. An
organization coming from a stable mainframe
environment that does not emphasize compati-
bility with the world beyond the vendor may be a
'_:losed shop," especially if that organization
produces a very specialized product (such as
space ground support systems). The case studies
suggest that the FDD was not prepared to deal
with rapid market evolution. In the past, the
organization usually had time to choose tech-
nologies carefully and experiment with "seed"
projects. This approach was not geared to the
pace of change the developers had to adopt to
accomplish the transition to open systems. The
transition forced a cultivation of market aware-
hess, which in turn requires applying the disci-
pline and resources to track all aspects of
industrT evolution. Management must actively
encourage technical staff to follow market trends
and pursue continuing education.
Training for front-line workers. Beware of
unrealistic optimism on the part of both manag-
ers and technical staff regarding the ease with
which staff can master the new technologies.
The case studies revealed that people had a ten-
dency to think in terms of distinct skills to be
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learned, new, but similar to existing skills. In
reality, the myriad interrelationships of a new
suite of technologies, and the industry context in
which they are evolving, are very complex. Our
experience was that the amount of ramp-up time
needed to learn new technologies, from least to
most, was for UNIX, C, networking, and
X/Motif (most difficult to acquire even using a
GUI builder). When most of the team has to
learn all the technologies together, the time
invested is significant.
Technical compatibility. When a software
development shop first adopts open systems
technology, it may expect to easily interface with
open systems in client and peer organizations.
This expectation was not realized in the case
study projects; "plug and play" is not yet the
norm. Incompatibilities result if the organization
does not have detailed knowledge of the tech-
nologies used by the interfacing organization.
Open systems invite cooperation but do not
guarantee compatibility. Interacting organiza-
tions should discuss and document their agree-
ments on issues such as standards, COTS
product versions, and configuration management
assumptions.
Retooling the infrastructure. Organizations
such as the FDD with long-standing stable com-
puting environments have usually developed
customized software development toolsets and a
supporting infrastructure. When moving to a
new technology, problems that were previously
solved in the legacy environment may need to be
solved again because the infrastructure and tools
have changed. Even a technically mature organ-
ization may be unprepared for the extent to
which it must develop new approaches to basic
software engineering problems that it thought it
had solved long ago. A mature organization may
be at a disadvantage because of a high comfort
level with its proven techniques.
System engineering. In all three cases studied,
the transition to open systems caused the
developers to shift from a purely software engi-
neering viewpoint to more of a system
engineering perspective. In the absence of a
stable technical infrastructure, the developers
had to devote considerable time and effort to
understanding engineering topics for which their
previous project experiences had not prepared
them. Both hardware and software components
had to be treated more or less equally. Emphasis
shifted from crafting systems from lines of code
to selecting and integrating the right combination
of hardware and software components. When no
established computing infrastructure exists,
developers must perform systems engineering
analysis at the start of the project to plan for and
procure sufficient resources.
Project Management Lessons
Realisttc expectations. Project managers cannot
expect to achieve all the goals during a technol-
ogy transition that the organization achieved in
the stable technology. Aiming for these goals
can lead to over-commilxnents and compromise
the success of the transition. The project man-
ager must be strategically aggressive but tacti-
cally conservative, and careful when making
commitments.
Accurate effort estzmanon. Technology transi-
tion requires investment. The SEL Manager's
Handbook, source of the FDD's project estimate
models, recommends applying an additional
effort multiplier of 2.3 when a project type and
the technical environment are new to the organi-
zation. Had the case study projects followed this
guidance, the UIX and XTE AGSS projects
would have started with much more realistic
effort estimates. The GSS project, which did not
involve the same degree of transition as the other
two, came closer to the standard model, and the
effort multiplier may not have applied to it.
Staffing and skill mix. The manager in the leg-
acy environment faces a particularly difficult
staffing and training issue. The case study proj-
ects used 'hot" technology, but because the
FDD's existing technology was mainframe
based, it did not tend to attract and retain people
with expertise in new technologies. Those
recruits who did have open systems experience
generally were not experienced in either
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application development or in the FDD's legacy
systems and problem domain.
Training for technical managers. One problem
with this technology transition was that the
technical managers and senior technical people
were reared in an older technology. The case
studies show a tacit assumption that project
managers would somehow "pick up" the open
systems concepts sufficiently to competently
plan and manage these projects. In fact, when
project planners lack an understanding of the
technology their team is using, they may not
understand the real issues and cannot make good
planning decisions. Open systems approaches
bring significantly different problem-solving
tools and techniques. Technical managers need
training and hands-on experience. They need to
know what they are up against when setting
schedules and budgets.
Role of prototyping. Although useful for
avoiding disaster, prototyping is not in itself a
sufficient basis for project planning. A proto-
type does not confer organizational learning
Even a second-time use of a technology may not
uncover all the possible pitfalls. Organizations
have to assimilate information until they reach
the point of "intuition."
Methodology. Methodolo_, requirements ori-
ented toward the routine design problem may
actually impede learning, because they assume
the problem-solving technology is already well
understood. For example, the requirement that
all unit designs be completed before any units are
coded makes it impossible to feed lessons learned
about the new environment into the design proc-
ess. Although progress is harder to measure,
iteration promotes learmng the new environment.
When introducing new technologies, a more
appropriate approach may be to develop the
system framework first and the application func-
tionality later. The project can then be broken
into numerous small builds and progress and
expended effort assessed after each build. The
development plan should be readjusted accord-
ingly. To gaiv integration experience in the new
environment, functionality, should be slipped
from early to later builds rather than delaying
delivery of early builds.
Software metrics. Metrics are critical to under-
standing the new technology. However, meas-
urement programs established for the old
technology may not be adequate for the new.
Predictors based on source lines of code may not
be meaningful when using GU1 builders, code
generators, and COTS packages.
Conclusions and
Recommendations
A technology transition plan. While it is not our
purpose to develop a model for technology
transition planning, our observations do suggest
issues that a transition plan should address.
Table 2 presents our suggestions from the per-
spective of a fairly large organization with a
mature and stable, but dated, technology infra-
structure. (The ordering of topics does not imply
a procedural sequence.)
Climbing the hills of technology infusion.
Adopting a new technology is like climbing a hill
representing the cost of the transition. Few
computing professionals and managers are
expert at estimating the height of the hill and the
rate of progress over it. Yet as Figure 3 shows,
the increasing pace of change brings whole
ranges of hills to climb. The FDD, having suc-
cessfully applied the SEL process improvement
concepts in a stable environment, was unpre-
pared for the rapid pace of the transition to open
systems. Perhaps the FDD, with its stable envi-
ronment and funding, had become accustomed to
investigating technologies at its ovm pace. In the
current technological environment, however, we
may not have the luxury to control which tech-
nology hills we will climb or when.
Can we learn to adopt technologies faster and
more efficiently? A common element in these
case studies is a failure to realize that technology
transition alters the essence of the design prob-
lem. The literature on the design process distin-
guishes between routine design and variant, or
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innovative, design. In routine design, both the
problem domain and the problem-solving process
are well understood, and the main issue is
accommodating an established solution to proj-
ect-specific needs. But in variant design, while
the problem domain may still be well understood,
the problem-solving process is not. Approaching
the variant design problem as if it were just a
more difficult instance of the routine problem, to
which slightly adjusted models and procedures
can be applied, leads to problems.
Improving management models for "emerging
technology" projects. Variant design problems
can be expected whenever new technologies are
adopted. The software industry needs to sys-
tematize its knowledge of them. Project
planners must understand when the organization
is going through a transition that fundamentally
changes the problem-solving process so they can
approach it the right way. Of course, the
problem is compounded by the fact that teclmol-
ogy drives organizational structures; as industry
Table 2. Recommended Content of Transition Plan
Topic Conmumts
How mature is the technology? Look at the hardware/softwaresolutions being adoptedby other
organizations. Attendtrade shows andconferences. Challenge the assumptionthat your organi-
zation is unique in its needs or functions. Be proaetivein definingbusiness directionin terms of
new technologies.
Hardware/ Challenge the assumptionthat existing equipment must be retained for cost-effectiveness. The
software tradeoffs cost of software development and development environments may outweighequipment cost.
Pilot projects Define realistic goals for pilot projects; avoid developing products best left to industry (such as
distributed operating systems). Concentrate on using new technology to bolster the organiza-
tion's traditional strengths. Keep initial transition projects small.
Personal contact Expedite personalcontact across departmentboundaries. Establish mechanismssuch as cross-
departmentworking groups, butavoid too much structure Allow teams flexibility to discover
what areas need focus and how to work together.
Methodology An iterative approachpromotes learning. Use numeroussmall builds to gain integration experi-
ence in the new environment. Slip functionality rather than delay delivery. Challenge
methodologyrequirements focused on the routine design problem.
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Where are we on Infusion Hill?
Where are we going and when will we get there?
cost
old technology
?
?
time
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Figure 3. The Hills of Technology Infusion
retools, organizations discover possibilities that
prompt them to reexamine their missions.
Although this exploration can be guided only in
broad outline, the need to steer projects through
these uncharted waters remains.
New Directions for the FDD
Despite transition problems, the software devel-
oped by the projects we studied appears to be of
good technical quality. The XTE systems were
proved reliable in testing and are being reused by
other projects for upcoming missions. New proj-
ects are using the UIX and the GSS in their
designs. The FDD itself is embarking on full-
scale conversion to a distributed system, porting
or replacing up to 6 million lines of legacy sot_-
ware. A stable infrastructure for open systems is
beginning to evolve within the FDD, improving
prospects for success.
Moving a large organization from a mainframe
legacy to a new environment of open systems is a
complex technology transition problem. The
transition involves much more than a simple
switch of tools and techniques. Transitions that
cause sudden shifts from routine to variant
design problems are likely to become more
common in the future. Our challenge is to apply
organizational learning techniques in staying
abreast of industry developments, and to effec-
tively incorporate them in our experience base.
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Lessons Learned in Transitioning to an
Open Systems Environment
Dillard Boland
Dave Green
Warren Steger
Purpose and Method
D Problem: Transition to a new technology requires investment
before benefits are realized -- how can we plan and manage
efficient transitions in the midst of rapid industry evolution?
[] Method: Study three projects in the GSFC Flight Dynamics
Division (FDD) moving from a mainframe environment to
"open systems" workstation technology
[] Goal: Improve our understanding of technology transition
and identify lessons learned
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Background: The FDD Software
Development Organization
[] Through the SEL process, the FDD has achieved a track
record of continuous improvement in reuse, error rates,
and other software characteristics
17 Stable development environment: IBM mainframe with
FORTRAN, and DEC VAX with Ada
I-I Focused SEL experiments: OO, Ada, Cleanroom, IV&V,
resources usage
[] Computing environment held relatively constant while
process and products evolved
e,,e=lp
Background: Transition of the FDD to
Open Systems
[]
[]
[]
I"f'e"
I,,=R=
FDD/SEL achievements were within the context of
stable mainframe and VAX computing environments
Now FDD is moving toward open systems
• Workstation computing platforms, industry
standards, and conventions
• Use widely available COTS products; emphasize
portability and interoperability
• Goals are economic and technical: less vendor
dominance, more competing solutions, •more
bang for the buck •
How will this dramatic change in computing
environment affect our products and processes?
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Background: Transition of the FDD to
Open Systems
Percent of yewly
l_Jdget spent on
software projects
using open
technoJogles
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The Case Study Projects
UIX PC (SCO UNIX), HP 65,000 C MultJapplication user
Interface system
GSS DEC Alpha, HP 212,000 Ads Multiapplication attitude
support components
XTE AGSS HP 150,000 C Mission attitude ground
(awo_) Mid FORTRAN support applications
Planned using SEL models based on local mainframe and VAX experience
with adjustments for new technology
ffr
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Case Study Projects: Comparision of
Results
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Case Study I -- UIX
[] We wanted to develop a common user interface and
executive framework for interactive, distributed mission
support systems
[] We did the logical thing: up-front prototyping
• Led to necessary architectural and conceptual changes
• Not a good basis for project planning: final system is
much larger and more complex than prototype indicated
[] Lack of a preestablished system architecure ("middleware")
proved to be a significant technical and organizational
stumbling block
[] The project was refocused on the user interface and
extended: wait for industry middleware to evolve before
attacking distributed executive
I_l-f
tla=lM= ,0=_+ .
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Case Study 2 -- GSS
[]
[]
[]
[]
We wanted a class library of flight dynamics capabilities
from which we could build our systems; we prototyped it
along with the UIX
We wanted to transition Ada development to workstation
environment, but have not been able to except for
integration and test phases
We discovered that matching development toolset
capabilities available on DEC/Alpha/Open VMS is not yet
cost effective on our target platforms
Current plan is to phase in development tools as market
forces drive the costs of Ada development systems down
(this is already happening)
Case Study 3 -- XTE AGSS
[]
[]
We needed to integrate with client/server software developed by
another group at GSFC, and to provide our first interactive X/Motif
system for mission support (UIX was not ready)
We assumed we could achieve our current norms: compressed
development schedules and reusable software
[]
[]
[]
We severely underestimated the complexity and functionality
required to meet these goals in a new environment
We underestimated the difficulties of interfacing with other group's
software (same "open" technologies, but environment differences
such as COTS products at different version levels)
Technology transfer facilitated by relocating developers to the
other organization's site to infuse their technology, and by
adopting highly iterative implementation approach
e_lPlp,
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Lessons Learned: Organizational
[]
[]
[]
A coordinated organizational transition plan, with
management commitment, is essential
Changing technology can blur traditional roles,
garble communications, and cause friction,
because the "old ways" do not always adapt well to
new technology
The organization must find ways to cooperate and
share lessons learned across departmental
boundaries; technology transition is not the time
for information hiding!
e"lPdP'
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Lessons Learned: Technological
[] Open systems and rapid industry change demand
we cultivate market awareness to replace our
"closed shop" outlook
[] Open systems invite cooperation but do not
ensure compatibility: stress coordination and
communication
[] Early training is important for both the technical
managers and the frontline workers
[] Problems previously solved in legacy environment
(e.g., CM, reuse) often must be solved again in the
new environment
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Lessons Learned: Project Management
[]
[]
[]
[]
Open systems require open minds: awareness of market
trends, continuous organizational learning, structured
feedback of lessons learned
Use prototyping to avoid disaster but not as a basis for
project planning
Don't expect to achieve the goals of a technologically mature
organization while you are transitioning
We need a better management model for "emerging
technology" projects
¢=,e=,r
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Conclusions and Recommendations
[] We need scientific data about technology transitions: The
industry needs to honestly appraise successes and failures
and learn from them
[] Our existing SEL models are not adequate for technology
transitions: Upgrade them
[] Open systems concepts and decreasing hardware costs
force a systems (not just software) engineering approach
[] Personal contact is the most effective means of information
sharing on technology transition - need an institutional
mechanism
[] We must plan for continuously infusing technology and
commit resources to that end
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[]
The Hills of Technology Infusion
In a rapidly evolving industry and an open marketplace, we
must learn better skills for evaluating and adopting new
technologies
COSt
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Where are we on Infusion Hill?
Where are we going and when will we get there?
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New Directions for the FDD
[] XTE AGSS subsystems are being reused for upcoming
missions
[] EOSTGSS project just completed PDR
• Up-front emphasis on system engineering
• Using UIX as part of infrastructure
[] Flight Dynamics Distributed System
• Port or replace the 6 million SLOC of our mainframe
and VAX legacy
• Will use GSS and UIX
• infrastructure is now coming into place
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